a turn away from the search for social origins. Van Gennep understood this turning away from evolutionary reconstructions of social history as itself constitutive of modern ethnography, if not of the human sciences in general.
I became convinced very rapidly that if the nineteenth century was the century of historical sciences, then the twentieth was to be that of the ethnographical sciences.... I would say that ethnography in the twentieth century will prove the foundation upon which a new philosophic conception of mankind will be constructed. 5 While we are familiar with the decline of historicism as the dominant motif of cultural interpretation in the late nineteenth century, ethnography's position in relation to this development is less well understood. When we look for other manifestations of a dehistoricized, revitalized primitive, for example in aesthetic modernism or psychoanalysis, it becomes clear that the reanimation of the primitive was a widespread, radical event, one which introduced into the European order of things an ambivalent agent of indefinite power. Yet the role of the primitive in the thought of such emblematic thinkers as Freud and Durkheim has interested later commentators less as it bears upon the problem of ethnography, than as symptomatic of fin-de-siècle irrationalism. This substitution (of the irrational for the primitive) pervades historiography on the subject, and in so doing leaves unexamined the continued use of a concept native to the fin-de-siècle period. 6 In what follows, a discursive analysis, à la Foucault's earlier works, will be used to capture the historical specificity of the primitive in its ethnographic articulation.
The shift in ethnographic discourse was neither instantaneous nor absolute. The intellectual premises of social evolutionism, of an ethnographic search for social origins, endured as long as did the European colonial order. Yet in ethnographic discourse, at least, the diminishment of these premises c. 1900 is undeniable. Prior to the trauma of the First World War, independent of specific field research experiences, and simultaneous with a revaluation of the primitive in a host of other domains, ethnography began to release the primitive from its bondage to history. 7 The ontological diminution of history in ethnographic discourse, I contend, was simultaneously a reanimation of the ethnographic subject, the attribution of vitality to an entity that had previously subsisted in discourse as a fossil. Henceforth, Western European scholars began to integrate the primitive into coherent, systematic, and spontaneous unities that were no longer condemned outright by the judge of evolutionary history. Above all, the resources of ethnographic discourse ceased to endow an archaeological metaphor of the primitive, in favour of a vitalist one.
The primitive of ethnographic discourse between 1870 and 1890 was the ground zero of social evolution, the Big Bang of human culture, and contained within itself the mechanism of all social development. The ethnographic primitive was, for Edward Burnett Tylor and his followers, an initial state circumscribed in time and space, an "event" that, though it continued to echo through history in the form of various survivals, did not in any significant way subsist as a determining factor in human history. The metaphor of the primitive was, in the social evolutionary heydays of the 1870s and 1880s, suitably archaeological, and, to a lesser extent, geological. In either case, the primitive was inert. Like fossil or artifactual remains, it was a sign of a prior stage that had been surpassed in the unilinear course of human progress. And, as "superstitions die slowly", and "linger like haunting shades around the scenes of their former activities", only a very thin line separated ethnographic discourse upon primitive societies from folkloric collection of ghost stories and the sober appointment of committees to investigate supernatural visitations. 8 "Does it not", queried one subscriber to the Folk-lore record of 1878, "come within the province of the Folk-Lore Society to explain the nature of apparitions?" 9 Tylor's paradigmatic theory of primitive religion was unanimously recognized to be essentially a "ghost" theory of the origin of religion, not surprising for what Andrew Lang described as "an age such as ours, so rich in ghost stories". 10 The narration of the supernatural, whether as the history of hallucination, the undisciplined workings of human reason, or an indulgence in exoticism, was a prominent feature of late nineteenth-century ethnography and of the more general late-Victorian taste for the macabre. The ethnographic preoccupation with spectres, hauntings, and the world of "savage" fancy all take meaning with reference to a representation of "savage" societies as liminal, suspended between current existence and certain demise.
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The ethnographic subject in classical social evolutionary discourse was thus in the paradoxical state of being dead and alive. In this way, the archaeological metaphor was juxtaposed with the spectral reality of living primitives beyond Europe. Wrote the Celtic folklorist George Laurence Gomme in 1883, of the study of primitive English village life:
With only archaeology to help us, the mud huts or cave dwellings are untenanted; the flint implements, the ornaments, the domestic utensils are ownerless; the graves have no associations beyond the skeleton remains.... The old-world gods are set up on their pedestals; but the worshippers and all the outpourings of their minds are but dimly seen far in the background. But guided by comparative folk-lore we may once more restore life into this desolated region. 12 Where primitives were not immediately available for study, imagination could conjure them. Though the ethnographic writer might supply the enlivening breath, the result remained only a semblance, dependent upon scholarly imagination for its achievement. As I hope to show, the ethnographic subject underwent a reanimation at the fin-de-siècle, though not at the hand of any one ethnographer, nor as a result of any particular field encounter. Thereafter it stood in no need of new life, coming instead fully into possession of its own. Unlike the "culture fossils", artifacts or phantasms studied before the closing decade of the nineteenth century, a good deal of what was construed as evidence by ethnographic writers after 1890 was avowed to be alive and walking the earth in all the various regions of "savagery", if not at the heart of "civilization". 13 There was, under such circumstances, no need to "restore life" to weathered ethnographic relics. The primitive entered Victorian ethnographic discourse as a revenant, a visitor from the dead summoned by the ethnographic medium, and passed into the twentieth century transformed from an apparition into an agent, if still a heavily restrained and guarded one.
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL MODEL
The archaeological model of the primitive in the classical texts of nineteenth-century ethnography certainly had to do with contemporary archaeological knowledge, and the Scandinavian reconstruction of the development of human civilization upon a hierarchy of tool-making capacities (ages of stone, bronze, and iron).
14 This metaphor persisted, however, only through the absence of conditions that might have contradicted it. That archaeology and geology might share their metaphors with a nascent discourse on the nature of human societies was contingent upon the stability of the entities categorized. The ethnographic subject was, to use Ian Hacking's phrase, an "indifferent kind", what the word inanimate might describe did it not have such connotations of lifeless matter. 15 Dead matter, however, was more apt. "The ethnographer's course ... should be like that of the anatomist who carries on his studies if possible rather on dead than on living subjects", declared Tylor, generalizing the history of primitive custom and belief as one of "dwindling and decay". 16 Indeed, one of the most common clichés in the ethnographic texts of the post-1870 period was that of primitive peoples vanishing before the colonial expansion of the European, carrier both of disease and of modernity. "What we call civilisation stamps out some races of mankind all-together -as, for instance, it has stamped out the Tasmanians." 17 Wrote James Frazer in 1908, "in some places, for example, in Tasmania, the savage is already extinct; in others, as in Australia, he is dying". Elsewhere, as in Central and Southern Africa, "the influence of traders, officials, and missionaries is so rapidly disintegrating and effacing the native customs, that with the passing of the older generation even the memory of them will soon in many places be gone". 18 "It is our duty", declared Sidney Hartland in his Presidential Address to the Folklore Society in 1900, "to provide for the preservation of the memory, and not merely of the perishing races under our sway, and of stages of culture in the process of transformation or total disappearance within our borders, but also as full a record as may be of what they were and what they signified in the history of the world". 19 As long as the exemplary cases of colonial culture contact were North America, Australia and Tasmania (rather than, as would be the case after 1900, the populous colonies of Indochina, India, and South Africa), and as long as European industrialization continued to shift the balance of power from agriculture to manufacture and the city, then the archaeological metaphor would indeed be a powerful component in a theory of social evolution that disbursed agency only to the representatives of modernity. The author of a guide to the collection of folklore in Northern England observed that a "great part of the Country of Durham is indeed spoiled (in an antiquarian point of view) by collieries". Fortunately, "it still contains some quiet villages far away from great thoroughfares, where strange tales are told and strange customs practised", though, the author admits, they "are fast fading away". 20 The collieries of Durham county might be a nuisance to the folklorist for having disrupted the fabric of traditional social life, but they were signs of modernization's irreversibility. The archaeological metaphor could have been cognitively viable only when applied to a world understood as doomed and indifferent to progress, whence arose no appreciable resistance to the matrix of inquiries and institutions that sustained it.
"The mind of the savage", wrote Tylor in Primitive culture (1871), was as "distant from us in time as the stars are distant from us in space", 21 obscured, as Lang put it, "in the dark and backward abysm of time". 22 Tylor's sense of the magnitude of time separating early from modern man was highly dependent upon the achievements of nineteenth-century archaeology in portraying various families of human artifacts as stages in the development of human technological capacity. 23 Indeed, what was perceived as the most radical aspect of the "social evolutionary" school which later ethnographers saw as Tylor's creation, was the extension of a classificatory schema and interpretive framework from material to moral domains: from arrowheads, as it were, to religion. When the folklorist Alfred Nutt began his journal The archaeological review in 1888, Tylor took note in its opening pages of the "relation ... of mutual assistance" that had prevailed between anthropology and archaeology "from the beginning". 24 Both Tylor and Gomme saw archaeology as a servant of anthropology; the latter for Tylor had raised archaeology from the status of antiquarianism to that of a science by providing it with a comparative method and a universal theory. Gomme saw archaeology as an assistant to "the most comprehensive of all historical sciences, anthropology". 25 This was embodied in the organization of the review: "The first section will be devoted to what is more properly considered anthropological archaeology, as it is studied by the Anthropological Institute. It will include savage customs and beliefs, ethnology, some departments of folklore, mythology, and such studies in comparative archaeology [founded, he pointed out, by three non-archaeologists -Tylor, J. F. McLennan, and Sir Henry Maine] as make a definite contribution to the history of man." The next section, archaeology proper, would "include the records of geology so far as they reveal the doings of man". A third "historical" section balanced the rubrics encompassed by the review.
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In 1890, The archaeological review was absorbed by the Folklore journal, an earlier version of which had been founded in 1878 by the self-styled followers of the social evolutionary program laid down in Tylor's Primitive culture. 27 Alfred Nutt, the Review's editor, made the identity of the two journal's research programs explicit:
The folk-lorist of today may thus be described as chiefly interested in the facts ... of popular traditions, and as using them in the same way as the geologist uses fossils, or as the archaeologist uses the material remains of man's art and craft in order to determine the age and sequence of culture strata. 28 A distinctive method arose after 1870 that coordinated with the archaeological metaphor of social evolutionary theory: the exhaustive archival ordering of dead, rather than living, ethnographic specimens. As with so many branches of knowledge in the late nineteenth century, the positivist hope was strong that the simple accumulation of such information would illuminate the questions of human social origins and purpose. As James Frazer put it in as late as 1908,
[W]e cherish a belief that if we truly love and seek knowledge for its own sake, without any ulterior aim, every addition we make to it, however insignificant and useless it may appear, will at last be found to work together with the whole accumulated store for the general good of mankind. 29 The later nineteenth century was an age of encyclopaedias and professional congresses, of compendiums, catalogues, and the intricate cross-referencing of sources. The Victorian ethnographer, to a degree not far removed from that of scholars in kindred fields such as classical history, was as dedicated to the pure accumulation of knowledge, as to its exposure, exchange, and progressive refinement. Indeed, the collective accumulation of data took precedence over analysis, which was deferred to an unspecified time, when, as Frazer put it, "accounts of the existing customs and beliefs of savages ... have been obtained, when the records existing in our libraries have been fully scrutinized, and when the whole body of information has been classified and digested". 30 Thus the pedantic scavenging for examples and their mounting, as an entomologist would pin butterflies, on endless trays of fiches ("If you are really interested in detail", offered the French ethnographer Arnold van Gennep to Frazer, à propos of West African data, "I may send you my fiches"), or the fascination with the new information technology of indexing. 31 Declared Gomme in 1892, "we must leave off poetising about folk-lore, and commence to arrange it in statistical columns". 32 Enumerating the priorities of the Folklore Society in the same address, Gomme went on to state the third "platform" of the society to be "the collection of all that remains yet uncollected in each county of the kingdom".
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The Folk-Lore Society sponsored a project in which the pre-existing antiquarian literature pertaining to each English county was to be systematically sifted for raw folkloric data. The first tome of the series County folk-lore so produced, covering four counties, was published in 1895. "As a starting point for the work of collection it is desirable to know what has already been recorded -not that it will be superfluous to record it again with increased precision and fuller particulars." 34 Such work, Gomme had urged in 1880, "should continue until every scrap of folk-lore is recorded in print". 35 The stereotypical instrument for the collection of ethnographic data was the questionnaire, the exemplars of which were the British Association for the Advancement of Science's Notes and queries on anthropology (1st edn, 1874), followed in renown by the Folk-Lore Society's Handbook to the science of folklore (1879), and Handbook of folklore (1890, 1912) . Such texts as Frazer's thin volume Totemism (1887), though not exclusively in questionnaire form, served the same purpose of suggesting questions that should inform data gathering under predetermined rubrics. Totemism was circulated in the Anglo-American colonial world in the years immediately following its publication, where it elicited a number of ethnographic contributions from interested individuals. Indeed, a thorough study of the questionnaire method of ethnographic knowledge production might confirm the hypothesis that empire was the ideology of ethnography, rather than ethnography being the ideology of empire. For the chief standard applied to the collection of ethnographic material was comprehensiveness, and the only guarantee of this method was the geographical extent and stability of empire. The Victorian ethnographic archive was erected in a style of bureaucratic transcendence that complemented, if not surpassed, the political ideals of the Pax Britannica; "monuments of words", as Frazer put it, "that will yet last when your cannons have crumbled and your flags have moulded into dust". 36 Yet Frazer qualified this confidence with a characteristic note of anxiety. " [W] herever the ancient customs and beliefs of a primitive race have passed away unrecorded, a document of human history has perished beyond recall. Unhappily this destruction of the archives, as we may call it, is going on apace." 37 Like the Egyptian obelisk erected in the heart of Paris by Louis-Philippe, the ethnographic archive was meant to outlast its parent civilization in order to attest the grandeur of its descent. Like the space probe of the late twentieth century, it would enable the sum total of scientific truth to escape the possibility, ever darker, of Armageddon.
Whether in the remote villages of England or in the colonies, what this archival method of ethnography most often stressed was tact in dealings with potential informants. When the advocates of archival ethnography extrapolated from their methods of collection to the virtues of tact for practical government, they stressed the sympathy of the rulers for the ruled that would be engendered, and the general improvement of relations that this would bring about between Europeans and a population whose subjection was unquestioned. The Punjab administrative officer Sir Richard Temple expressed this before the anthropological section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science at the late date of 1913.
To put the proposition in its briefest form: in order to succeed in administration a man must use tact. Tact is the social expression of discernment and insight, qualities born of intuitive anthropological knowledge, and that is what it is necessary to induce in those sent abroad to become eventually the controllers of other kinds of men. What is required, therefore, is that in youth they should have imbibed the anthropological habit, so that as a result of having been taught how to study mankind, they may learn what it is necessary to know of those about them correctly, and in the shortest practicable time. 38 With reference to the colonial setting, the intangible posture of ethnographic noblesse oblige very rarely corresponded to any concrete administrative policies, or bore any resemblance to what later administrators would refer to as "native policy". The utility of archival ethnography was, rather, its reinforcement of a general humanistic attitude.
The more intimate our acquaintance with the races we have to deal with and subjugate, the more we shall find what it means to stand with them on the same platform of common humanity. If the object of government be ... the good of the governed, it is for the governing race to fit itself for the task by laying to heart the lessons and adopting the processes of practical anthropology. 39 When the actors engaged in the archaeological collection of ethnographic data envisaged the practical bearing of their project upon British social relations, or the administration of the British Empire, it was as a salutary effect arising from contact between classes or races with otherwise opposite destinies. 40 Across such a gap, only a gentle, somewhat forlorn sympathy was required for the fulfilment of the archival objectives of both science and Empire.
ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE CRISIS OF POSITIVISM
A nagging suspicion took hold around 1890, in Britain especially, but in France as well, that the hopes upon which the ethnographic archive had been based were misplaced, and that answers to questions of human social origins would not automatically emerge from the mountainous records of customs, rites, beliefs, and myths gathered together and ordered in European libraries. In the eyes of the French ethnographer Arnold van Gennep shortly before the war, the universe of ethnographic facts was fast becoming top-heavy, far exceeding anyone's ability to make sense of it. The resulting lack of orientation led scholars across Europe, whom he labelled satirically "demi-savants", to draw ridiculous conclusions from unmanageably large amounts of data. 41 At about the same time, the English anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown likewise expressed impatience with nineteenthcentury ethnographic erudition, declaring it to be scholastic, and suggesting that it be done away with in a single stroke. Referring to the highest authorities of ethnographic discourse at the time, Radcliffe-Brown wrote that "one thing I have learnt from my work in W[estern] A[ustralia] is that writers on Australian tribes such as Frazer, Howitt, Lang, etc. have very much misunderstood the real facts". 42 Much like Thomas Richards's vision of the "imperial archive", ethnographic writers around 1900 felt that the science of the period bloated under a mass of positivity, a swelling of factual knowledge that threatened to overwhelm those who dealt with it, and to render itself meaningless in the process. 43 In 1891 the scholar of medieval British legal institutions, Frederick Pollock, wrote: "at all events, we are accumulating an amount of printed matter which I tremble to think of." 44 "During the last twenty years", Sidney Hartland told the assembled membership of the Folklore Society in 1900, "the work of observation and collection all over the world has swollen our libraries to an alarming extent". 45 By the turn of the century, a wide range of folklorists, sociologists, and ethnographic thinkers had expressed doubts over the methods and goals of the evolutionary project: whether there was indeed one single line of evolutionary development along which all existing societies could be arranged as representatives of a natural progression; and whether the method of constructing such a progression, by comparing single units of information drawn from vastly different social contexts, did not lead to seriously distorted conclusions. Both R. R. Marett at Oxford, and Arnold van Gennep in France, called for new methods of data collection, based on varieties of direct participation in, and observation of, the societies in question. The fieldwork revolution, by which anthropology is conventionally understood to have ceased to be a dilettantish, literary practice, and to have become an empirical, methodologically autonomous science, was but one moment -a highly visible and influential one -in the transformation which these and other authors initiated. The language with which they did so consciously distanced itself from earlier archaeological metaphors of social evolutionism that had represented the primitive as inert, either dead or dying. Such language had been convenient to the archival purposes of social evolutionism, and remained free from contradiction so long as the entities categorized as primitive did not sally forth from their burial sites to contest their status. Around 1900, however, a chorus of voices rose bearing witness to the durability, vitality, and potentially subversive agency of the primitive in all its manifestations, whether colonial or metropolitan. Wrote Marett in 1914, "the respective methods of geology and human history must remain as the poles asunder for the obvious reason that the earth is dead, while man is alive ... man does not lend himself readily to theoretical petrifaction". 46 Looking to the colonial world, Sir Henry Maine described India as "a most energetic expression of [Britain's] past", a "chaos of survivals" "vigorously surviving" and "tenacious of life". 47 The archaeological model of the primitive could not withstand a world in which the stability of colonial power relations was ever more insecure, in which the ethnographic subject did not perish but multiply, did not vanish through assimilation, but resist in difference. As the Indianist William Crooke noted in 1910, "at no point in the history of our rule was it more important to effect a reconciliation between the foreigner and the native. The social movement [in India] is the result of fermentation which is in progress among the subject peoples in many parts of the world". 48 The "fermentation of peoples" was not a concept easily incorporated into the social evolutionary model. Accordingly, the subject of ethnographic discourse was reanimated, together with the aims and objects of ethnography.
THE VITALIST MODEL
The vitalist model of the ethnographic subject derived from an assertion of the primitive as alive and potent, as much so in the present as in the past. From this, all else followed. The uniformitarian extension of the primitive dulled the utility of survivals ("culture fossils") as a concept, by denying that the primitive had ever ceased to be. Positivist dissection and reassembly of ethnographic facts simply could not do justice to the historical continuity of this object. The primitive was not to be found in the compound of individual ethnographic facts, but in the synchronic series into which they fitted, the wholes in which they functioned. The "fitting" into series and the "functioning" of wholes was itself the syncretic work of the primitive. Historical analysis missed the operation of this syncretism, while synchronic analysis captured it sur le vif. And like a living subject, the primitive was to be approached directly, engaged spontaneously, and mobilized not just to understand the past, but to change the future. The remainder of this article outlines the components of the vitalist model as they were enunciated in the years around 1900.
Against Ethnographic Atomism
Though ultimately sceptical of its fruition, Frazer was fully committed to the theoretical assumptions supporting the project of the ethnographic archive, the "sifting, arranging, and docketing" of information, "so that all books devoted to folk-lore subjects may be duly recorded in our archives and the particular subjects treated of them placed before the student". 49 Yet around him, others registered uncertainties, and were more willing to entertain the possibility of major revisions of the theoretical premises of ethnographic knowledge. In 1904, Arnold van Gennep decried the archival attitude in the introduction to his doctoral thesis, Taboo and totemism in Madagascar.
One may study social facts in two different manners. One may content oneself with describing them for the sake of their curiosity or rarity, much as a bibliophile would occupy himself with his incunabula and re-bindings; either in order to satisfy a desire to classify, like the general described by Anatole France, who recorded his division on fiches; or as a simple pastime providing the illusion of intellectual labour. Such is the method too often adopted by the majority of folklorists and ethnographers, and which consists of describing facts classed according to exterior characteristics, and lined up end to end. 50 In 1911, Marett made essentially the same criticism of the method grown up under social evolutionary theory, and referred to as comparative. Beginning with the premise that the human mind was everywhere the same and that over time it would accomplish the same progression of reasoning, various cultural phenomena would be arranged sequentially as examples of earlier or later phases in the development of mental capacity and accompanying social organization. Bizarre rites and customs in the midst of relatively modern surroundings were simply survivals of earlier phases that had atrophied and served only to indicate the prior existence of an earlier stage of social evolution. In the heyday of social evolutionism, most notoriously for Frazer, geography posed no obstacle to the comparison of any two rites, customs, or beliefs drawn from any two points on the globe, as long as they possessed a superficial resemblance. As Marett put it:
Hitherto, the trouble with anthropologists has been to see the wood for the trees. Even whilst attending mainly to the peoples of rude culture, they have heaped facts enough to bewilder both themselves and their readers. The time has come to do some sorting; or rather the sorting is doing itself. 51 This analytic dispersion of culture traits onto a Cartesian plane became more and more uncomfortable for British and French ethnographic thinkers after the turn of the century.
A good portion of this sentiment reiterated the powerful critique then being levelled at the "English school" of anthropology by the Durkheimian school of sociology in France and those loosely associated with the new "sociological methods". The chief criticism made by the Durkheimians addressed the twin problems of heavy-handed historical schemas and the legitimacy which such schemas lent to the isolation -the "uprooting" -of culture traits from their functions within a given, local, context. Acknowledging one such criticism advanced by Henri Hubert, collaborator of Marcel Mauss, the folklorist Charlotte Burne recognized that "we are proceeding on wrong methods, comparing recklessly, pulling up 'items' of folklore by the roots to set them beside other items, similarly uprooted, from other social systems and others stages of culture". 52 In the contemporary sociological writing of the Durkheimians, especially Marcel Mauss, the disestablishment of history's ontological priority was most severe. Sociology, wrote Mauss together with Paul Fauconnet, "makes no distinction between the institutions of 'savage' peoples, and those of 'barbarous' or 'civilized' nations". 53 The priority of tracing the long, errant, but ultimately progressive journey of humankind from distant savagery to modern civilization was shifted to the analysis of timeless social universals and their functional operation. The primitive was thus brought into communication with the modern. "The explanation of religious facts that it [the English school] pretends to give is insufficient, because it scrutinizes the origin of such facts, rather than their functioning." From this objection to the historical method of evolutionary reconstruction, Mauss passed on to a criticism of the "comparative method" as practised by evolutionists, a critique launched again and again as the evolutionary consensus broke apart. "One is tempted to compare institutions having the same form, though they do not necessarily have the same function. Often, the resemblance between such institutions is no more than fortuitous, making any conclusions drawn from their comparison erroneous." 54 Together with Marett, van Gennep rejected the archaeological conceptualization of peasant, folk, or primitive society. As part of his own criticism of the theory of survivals, van Gennep argued that, though certain cultural traits might be inherited from an earlier period, they were never isolated and vacant of meaning, but always integrated into a culture through the creative agency of the popular classes of societies. The history of human cultures, by implication, was one of constant, active syncretism, the identification and differentiation of groups and cultures and meaning. Van Gennep illustrated this in a discussion of the popular practices of medieval French Christians.
In fact, our Middle Ages were a period of original, collective, creation, upon a thoroughly contemporary basis, and composed of a wide range of diverse elements. Only in a minority of cases do the most ancient of these elements persist, with certainty, as survivals. The explanation for the identity of customs and of beliefs is often very simple, and there is no need to call in the theory of survivals. 55 Such analysis of ethnographic data at once opened the way to tentative formulations of cultural relativism. Declared W. Crooke to the Folklore Society in 1912, "the real distinction [between savage and civilized 'man'] being that the one expends his intellectual energy in directions which the other regards as unimportant", not that one preceded the other in historical appearance. 56 "The tendency is to jump from one particular fact to another considered to be still more primitive, while it is the rare analysis that elucidates what is typical, essential, and permanent in the body of evidence", wrote Mauss and Isidore Lévy in their survey of the historical studies of religion. 57 To the critics of the archaeological model, the ethnographic reconstruction of social origins entailed an arbitrary atomization of data.
The Fundamental Categories of Ethnography: Statics and Dynamics

"It [anthropology] cannot treat living things as machines", declared Marrett in 1911.
"What does it do, then? It takes the form of history", understood as the history of an organism composed of functioning components, for the total comprehension of which two separate methods had to be applied: the analytical, or static, which froze the object; and the dynamic, which set it moving again. 58 Neither could be dispensed with. Speaking of social analysis, he wrote, there are two ways in which a given set of institutions can be investigated, and of these one, so far as it is practicable, should precede the other. First the institutions should be examined as so many wheels in a social machine that is taken as if it were standing still. You simply note the characteristic make of each, and how it is placed in relation to the rest. Regarded in this static way, the institutions appear as "forms of social organization". Afterwards, the machine is supposed to be set going, and you contemplate the parts in movement. Regarded thus dynamically, the institutions appear as "customs". 59 Though history, or the dynamic aspect of social analysis, was present and explicitly valued in such texts, it was not the structuring form of argumentation. By Marett's light, the diachronic and the synchronic were to stand beside each other, not, unlike the object to which they are applied, organically interrelated, but rather brought into communication only through the labour of the investigator. 60 Such a conceptual distinction was necessary before purely synchronic analyses could claim ontological justification; this was done on the basis of the object's motility. The unquestioned priority of social change, of cause and effect traced out along a series of culture traits, was no more. It would be the choice of the investigator that determined the priority of static or dynamic in any given analysis, and the trend was increasingly toward the former.
The reaction against ethnographic atomism entailed greater concern for social and cultural unities; this further entailed a prejudice in favour of static, or synchronic, analyses of ethnographic data. In a series of letters exchanged between RadcliffeBrown and his mentor W. H. R. Rivers between 1912 and 1914, the apprentice and his master did not debate the merits of the evolutionary approach to social analysis per se, but rather the priority of historical in relation to static methodologies -what Rivers referred to in this case as "psychological", and Radcliffe-Brown as "social statics". Now the problems of sociology can be described as being of two kinds, which I shall call static and dynamic.... The postulate underlying what we may call social statics is that there are only a certain limited number of ways in which a human society can be constituted. A social organization is a whole composed of parts (the structure, institutions, customs, etc.) which are dependent on one another, and there are certain laws that regulate the relations of the parts one to another....
On the other hand, the problems of social dynamics are concerned with the changes that take place in social organization, i.e. in regulated modes of behaviour. Social dynamics deals with the causes that produce changes of social organization, and therefore with the origins of institutions.... I should hold ... that in most cases the solution ... of the statical problems must precede the study of the dynamic problems. 61 Unlike the practitioners of classical evolutionary syntheses, the vitalist ethnographers were acutely aware of an analytic dichotomy affecting ethnographic thinking. This dualism, introduced at the very core of ethnography, was bequeathed by it to much of twentieth-century social thought. Its peculiarity consisted of the fact that it established two ontologically distinct types of social analysis -the static and the dynamic -while privileging the former element in the pair.
To Study the Living and Not the Dead
"On one point only I would insist", said Marett before the Folklore Society in 1914, "namely, that the living must be studied in its own right and not by means of methods borrowed from the study of the lifeless". "There is no greater fallacy than to regard this or any other type of savagery as something that, having long ceased to grow, has somehow persisted as a fossil." 62 Successor to Tylor's chair of anthropology at Oxford, Marett, the dean of British anthropology, flatly negated his predecessor's vision of ethnography. In the same address, Marett attempted to reshape the aims and methods of folklore and ethnographic research along the lines of Bergsonian psychology. The record of human history itself, he argued, was of less interest than the vital reservoir from which flowed the energy of human social activity in all of its many forms. If there was such a thing as human nature, it was to be found in the duration of human consciousness, and the continual reappropriation of cultural elements drawn from their environments and shaped into meaningful wholes for which it provided the constitutive resin. Given this, it should not be surprising that Marett (together with Mauss and Hubert) was known for his interest in the Polynesian concept of mana, a sort of mobile, indestructible life force. "Human history ... is instinct with purposive movement through and through.... How then is psychology going to help us to keep folklore fresh and living? I suggest that it may do so by making the study of survivals turn on the question -how and why do survivals survive?" 63 For Marett, a critique of the theory of survivals was one of the first steps towards a more static than dynamic mode of ethnographic argument. The European peasantry, if viewed as more than an index of superseded stages of social evolution, like strata of the geological record thrown up by tectonic movements whose impulse originated elsewhere, was then the location of the most basic form of social agency.
It is in the life of the folk that we must seek the principle of growth. The continuous life of the folk constitutes as it were the germ plasm of society. Unless external conditions, that so largely make up the apparatus of so-called civilization, so act on the social body that their effects are transmitted to this general element and cause it to be itself transformed, then our cultural acquisitions are vain, because utterly transient, in the judgment of history.
64
In France, Arnold van Gennep mounted the same criticisms of social evolution as driven by the mental achievements of a rationalist élite. In doing so he, together with the Durkheimians, littered his work with programmatic statements differentiating the new social sciences from their "historical" precedents. "What is most important for the sciences of man, is that they reclaim their rightful place as sciences of the 'living', increasingly important to us all, from their position usurped by the sciences of the 'dead'." 65 Van Gennep saw the turn from social evolutionary thinking as part of a general disengagement from historical consciousness during the period, evidenced by realist literature, dramatic theatre informed by daily life, and the movement of biology from laboratories to field research stations. 66 Certain French nationalists articulated their programs in a similar language. The neo-traditionalists of the French "regionalist movement", under the leadership of Charles-Brun, based their program on many premises shared by van Gennep, such as a critique of administrative and cultural centralization, and the value of regional French diversity. Methodologically, as well, the regionalists distinguished themselves from what they viewed as their antiquarian predecessors, the best-known organs of which were such journals as Mélusine and the Revue des traditions populaires. Like the great conservative prime minister Jules Méline, and the nationalist novelist Maurice Barrès, the regionalists sought to energize France through selective appreciation of its rural life and provincial traditions, as opposed to serving as their curator. "Regionalism does not interest itself in frozen traditions, in mortal immobility. It borrows from the past all that is logical and living." "Regionalists must not be taken for embalmers." 67 The tropes of dead versus living sciences, and the proper balance to be struck between them, were also fundamental to the better-known methodological program of Franco-Swiss linguistics advanced under Ferdinand de Saussure and Antoine Meillet, the latter being a disciple of the former, and holder of the chair of comparative grammar at the Collège de France from 1906. 68 Meillet consciously associated himself with, and felt the tradition to which he belonged to be in harmony with, the Durkheimian project. 69 For Meillet, linguistics was systematic, rather than historical, and grounded upon sociological analysis. It was only recently, Meillet observed in 1906, that linguistics had begun to interest itself in modern, living, languages, justifying the expansion of linguistic purview on the grounds that the subject of linguistic study (as opposed to the subject of philology, or historical linguistics) was the organization of language as a system, rather than the origin of one or more given languages, or the evolution of particular meanings. "The new general linguistics, founded upon the precise and detailed study of all languages at all periods of their development ... has completely renovated our methods and ideas: upon a mass of particular historical facts, it superposes a doctrine of the whole, of a system." 70 "The constitution of a history of languages was an essential moment in the development of linguistics: but history can only be for linguistics a means, not an end." 71 In homage to Saussure upon succeeding him in the chair at the Collège de France, Meillet placed his master's work at the turn of an era, closing off one period, while opening up new avenues for future linguistic research. "The nineteenth century was the century of history.... Presently, the social sciences are in the process of constituting themselves, and linguistics must take its rightful place among them.... To look to the future, rather than to the past, is the surest way to follow the example of the master who preceded me in this chair." 
Direct Experience and Participation
The consequences of all of this for the method of ethnography did not pass unnoticed, and had to do chiefly with the spatial organization of ethnographic knowledge production. Social evolutionism had nullified geographical space, jumbling together evidence drawn from around the world in charts and progressions assembled in Europe. Nonetheless, it was premised on a palpable sense of distance between the European and the ethnographic subject. A virtual wall of time, or more precisely, a series of concentric temporal ramparts, insulated Europe from the vast regions of delayed evolution by which it was surrounded. A visual sense of this may be gained, once again, by turning to Frazer. Addressing all those "who view savages through a telescope, whether from a club or a college window", Frazer remarked that
[i]f our glass be a good one and we apply our eye to the end of it steadily, undistracted by the sights and sounds about us, we shall see and hear strange things, things very unlike those which may be seen and heard either in Pall Mall and Piccadilly, or in the grassy courts and echoing cloisters of an ancient university town. We shall not see the rush of cabs, omnibuses, and motors, nor be stunned by their long continuous roar.... If we are really intent on knowing the truth ... by long and patient effort we may come to see in the magic mirror of the mind a true reflection of a life which differs immeasurably from our own. 73 Frazer lived well into the era of ethnographic fieldwork, and the reanimation of the ethnographic subject, but his language remained solidly within the Victorian conception of ethnography as the conjuration of ghosts. Aware of the rise of more systematic, field-based research, Frazer acknowledged his allegiance to the school of anthropologists "who study savages at a safe distance, and have never perhaps seen one of them in their lives, though they may possibly have watched their images dancing silently in a cinematograph or heard the echo of their voices chanting and whooping out of a phonograph". 74 There are few eerier passages in the writings of pre-war ethnography. The terms of Frazer's relation to the scientific artifacts of ethnographic field research are redolent of all the mystery of a spiritualist séance. The dancing images and chanting voices are ghost-like visitations from beyond -quite literally, apparitions of the dead intruded into the straightforwardness of Piccadilly or Cambridge.
Few of Frazer's leading contemporaries were willing to remain with him in the dark grottoes of his ethnographic cenotaph. The ethnographer must not be satisfied simply to observe the dancing from afar, he must join in. As Marett enjoined, "Everything is taken with its whole context, and apart from context means next to nothing. That is why the observer must, before all things, watch and describe every rite in all its detail. He must learn the dance, to get the feeling [emphasis added]." 75 After all,
[w]e have folk-dances, folk-songs, and folk-dramas with us still; whether in a state of survival or revival, it hardly matters for my argument. The sympathetic study of these has of late made considerable progress among us, more especially after educated people had made the discovery that a method of acquiring insight into their nature was actually to take a hand in them, -to dance, sing, or act them as the case might be.... One should first give oneself the benefit of the experience so far as it can be reconstituted with the help of the traditional actions and words. 76 This means of arriving, in vivo, at the process of Bergsonian transformism as it occurred at the level of culture went hand in hand with the collapse of the temporal barriers mentioned above. Wrote Marett in a 1912 memo: "The immobility of custom, I believe, is largely the effect of distance. Look more closely and you will see perpetual modification in process." 77 Marett urged that observer participation be employed among the European folk, and that the dynamic of culture contact be investigated as it occurred among lower-class students at English boarding schools, and elsewhere between the classes. "When the folklorist has done this for us, we shall then have some chance of appreciating what culture-contact among savages means from the inside. So long as we examine such a process merely from the outside ... for all our stir we shall merely be marking time."
78 "I have almost come to the conclusion", wrote Radcliffe-Brown himself shortly before the war, "that it is useless to try and theorize about any people unless you have a first hand knowledge of them and their institutions". 79 With the reanimation of the ethnographic subject, and the subsequent collapse of the wall of time that had insulated Europe from its colonial surroundings, the line between ethnography and sociology was blurred, the distance separating the European and colonial shrank, and their relation ceased to be one of analogy, and became a question of social policies and social functions.
Across the Channel, van Gennep's call for the "direct observation" of ethnographic subjects followed immediately from his conception of ethnography as a science of the "living". Just as contemporary psychological research had developed techniques for the experimental observation of "children, the sick, the insane, and normal collectivities of all sorts", ethnography must hone its techniques of observation through immediate contact with its subjects. Van Gennep advanced what he called the "method of the emerging fact [la méthode du fait naissant]", by which he meant an application to ethnography and to the science of religions of the method practised in the natural sciences of provoking a phenomenon in order to study it, and in psychology of following all the phases of a mental phenomenon at the very moment when these phases present themselves for observation ... this method would be useful because it would take for its object not the finished fact, but the fact in the process of becoming such, seized at the very moment of its genesis and development. 80 In addition to the development of this method in the various European social sciences, van Gennep pointed out that contemporary ethnography was also full of accounts of the transformations wrought by "culture contact" in colonial settings (such as changes in the production patterns of local industries), and had in such cases used the "method of the emerging fact" without realizing it. 81 Fieldworkers themselves were gaining a greater sense of their indispensability. Among the small cohort of individuals who had been pursuing directed observation in Australia, expressions of discontent regarding the lack of control over the theoretical elaboration of their data by metropolitans were not infrequent. "All this kind of theorizing", Baldwin Spencer complained to James Frazer of Alfred Haddon and Andrew Lang, "is exasperating to anyone who knows the natives at first hand". Claiming authentic, first-hand knowledge, Spencer wrote of Ernest Crawley, author of a book on sex and marriage in primitive societies, that he "understands nothing whatever about the feelings of the real savage". 82 "The fieldworker of himself is learning to take his task more seriously than ever before", observed Marett in 1910. 83 Despite their often wilful submission to the authority of the metropolitan scholarly community, field researchers such as Spencer, together with others such as Fison and Howitt, devoted considerable energy to the development of standards by which they could assess the credibility of Australian field data on behalf of metropolitans: some writers were more reliable than others. The quality control of ethnographic data in Australia represented an augmentation in the scientific authority of the field researcher that complemented a metropolitan interest in on-site investigations.
The Vitalist Model and Social Intervention
In 1909, the president of the Folklore Society, the Jewish historian Moses Gaster, dissented from the ethos of archival ethnography in terms that were by then frequently recapitulated in the most respected forums of ethnographic discourse.
Science is not an inscription on a tombstone. To collect the remnants of the past in order to enshrine them in some beautifully adorned cases would be to miss entirely the aim and object of true study and scientific investigation. The real aim, on the contrary, must be to make the past a stepping stone to the future. 84 The location of such stepping stones had not been of interest to the likes of Frazer, who had repeatedly deferred the practical conclusions of ethnographic research to men of action. Such "[were] questions rather for the moralist, and the statesman, whose eagle vision scans the future, than for the humble student of the present and the past". 85 Increasingly after the turn of the century, however, ethnographic scholars were less willing to accept such a division of labour, and were more inclined to stress the immediate relevance of their researches not only to imperial questions, but as they bore on the "social question" within Europe. The knowledge of folklore, Sidney Hartland asserted, was directly relevant, not only to the colonial situation, but also to the conflict of classes within European societies. Hartland construed the social problem in the language of "tact".
The conflict of the classes and the masses about which we hear so much to-day is all the bitterer because of the chasm which education has opened between high and low.... It is true that we are doing our best to diminish the distance that has grown between the educated and uneducated. But it takes time; and ... it is worth while trying to condescend to the lower level, in order the more quickly to raise up those who are there to your own. 86 For Hartland, the distance signified was similar to that separating Europeans and colonials. Of course, the analogy between primitives and European peasants was already stock-in-trade in social evolutionist discourse. What makes such passages as the one above distinct from Tylor's conception of anthropology as a "reformer's science" in Primitive culture, however, is the focus not just on the reform of antique prejudices of religious origin, but on the amelioration of class tension. The former was well within the bounds of establishment liberal political philosophy; the latter was only then receiving legitimation. The appeal of sociology and its orientation towards the future well-being of society exerted a strong pull on ethnographic writers shortly before the war. As Marett, a Toynbee Hall activist and editor of the Oxford Christian Social Union's new journal, The economic review, saw it, The steady growth of interest in the whole group of subjects connected with Economics and social life has been a marked feature of recent English life and thought.... All the more earnest of the younger generation, as well as many who are older, are seeking for principles to guide them through the tangled mazes of social and industrial life. 87 While the social reformist C. F. G. Masterman, in The heart of empire, "recognise[d] the ineffectiveness of purely academic consideration and of programs formed in the study alone", Charlotte Burne pleaded that young students burning with the urge to improve the slums of London understand the value of apparently arcane folkloric studies, such as "the Australian marriage system", implying that only through a study of the natural course of social evolution in its tedious detail could reform be properly implemented and managed. 88 The relevance of the archaeological model of ethnography, such texts as this suggest, was no longer self-evident.
In contrast to the archival conception of ethnography's administrative utility, the rise of de-historicized study of the functional composition of societies resulted in a much more precise, concrete, and self-consciously scientific idiom regarding colonial administration. As the colonial ethnographer William Crooke urged, in 1910:
Thus it is certain that in the near future the relations between the foreigner and the native races will demand the increasing attention of statesmen at home and abroad. Here anthropology has a wide field of action in the examination of the causes which menace the very existence of the savage; of the condition of the mixed races, like the creole or the Eurasian; of the relations of native law and custom to the higher jurisprudence; of the decay of primitive industries in the face of industrial competition. 89 Here, tact is not an issue, but rather information and its application to the maintenance of stability in colonial societies. Questions such as the relation of European to local legal practice, the constitutional and juridical status of racial hybrids (Eurasians), and the construction of viable colonial economies were of immense concern to colonial administrators. It was to these concerns, Crooke felt, that an informed, ethnographic statics could both borrow and contribute. Notably, rather than passively witnessing the global demise of savage societies, Crooke urged anthropology to do what it might to preserve them.
CONCLUSION
The tenets of the archaeological model, as should be clear, were each challenged from one or another quarter by 1914 in Britain and France, prior to and independently of the fieldwork revolution associated with Radcliffe-Brown and BronisÄaw Malinowski. I have tried to show that, not only did this last development have a significant prehistory, but that it involved, at the most basic level, a reconstitution of the primitive as a category within Western European social thought. The points of opposition to social evolutionism generated by this reconstitution were multiple, often focused on one among its many components, but when taken together they reveal a logic of argumentation that would crystallize in more professional and technical writings of the inter-war period as functionalist social science. As with most aspects of cultural modernity consolidated after the First World War, its constituent elements, and the grounds for their deployment, were well prepared before 1914.
If an analogy for this new model is to be sought in the field of the human sciences, it is with the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. In his work and that of several colleagues and contemporaries, we see parallel preoccupations: a rejection of the search for the origins of individual words and their meanings, together with an explicit preference for the analysis of language as a static system. We also see there an acknowledgement of the intrinsic mutability of language, and the impossibility of stabilizing it by ordering it according to arbitrary grammatical categories. In the writings of Antoine Meillet, the unity of these prescriptions rests upon the conception of language as an unconscious phenomenon. I hope to have shown that the concept of the primitive performed such a unifying function within the field of ethnographic discourse in the years around 1900. As developments in the science of language would have such resounding consequences, not only for the knowledge of language, but also of the knowing subject, so, too, did the reanimation of the primitive signal not simply a new and better ethnography, but a redistribution of the economy of agency. A mysterious but discernable subject had joined the ethnographic family. To borrow the words of Lord Balfour, speaking of the Africans of the Cape Colony in 1904, "they are there, they are going to remain there". 90 The primitive in ethnographic discourse, like the African of the Cape, was not going to go away. The task before the social science of the period was to find a way of dealing with it.
